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Abstract 
This study examines the strategic interactions between the online channel strategies of a national 
brand manufacturer and the store brand strategies of a retailer. We develop a game-theoretical model 
in which a manufacturer makes channel choices, a retailer selects product lines, and both need to 
take the other’s strategy into consideration. We compare the results with cases where no interactions 
are involved to explicate how the manufacturer’s online channel choice affects the retailer’s store 
brand strategy, and vice versa. The results suggest that the retailer executes a more defensive strategy 
if the threat of the online channel is severe but tends to be cooperative when the threat is less 
alarming. The manufacturer, however, would rather give up its efficient online channel to act 
cooperatively when the store brand is introduced. Our findings explain certain stylized facts 
regarding supply chain coordination. 
Keywords: National Brand, Store Brand, Product Line Selection, Channel Choice, Interaction 
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1 Introduction 
The internet has profoundly changed the way firms 
conduct business (e.g., Chen et al., 2009; Liu et al., 
2010; Kwark et al., 2014, 2017; Wen & Lin, 2019), 
enabling a new channel, distinct from traditional retail 
channels, through which manufacturers can reach 
consumers. Manufacturers can set up online stores to 
sell directly to consumers, expand markets, or promote 
their brands (Alba et al., 1997; Brynjolfsson & 
Michael, 2000). Examples include leading high tech 
firms (e.g., Apple, IBM, and Cisco), as well as 
cosmetics manufacturers (e.g., L’Oreal, P&G, and 
Estee Lauder), beverage and food manufacturers (e.g., 
Budweiser Beer, Coca Cola, and Campbell Soup), 
sporting goods producers (e.g., Nike, Mizuno, and 
Puma), and electronics suppliers (e.g., PalmOne, 
Samsung, and Sony). The online channel is changing 
the structure of supply chains and may pose a threat to 
traditional retail channels. To offset possible 
cannibalization from the online channel, retailers can 
significantly increase marketing efforts (Hsiao & 
Chen, 2014), reduce purchases from manufacturers 
(Bucklin et al., 1997), or seek alternative partners 
(Brooker, 1999). The online channel also enables the 
application of new technologies and tools such as 
behavioral targeting to facilitate transactions (Feng et 
al., 2009; Chen et al., 2011; Hostler et al., 2011; Guo, 
2012; Yoon et al., 2013; Li et al., 2019). 
This study seeks to understand the dynamics of the 
supply chain in a situation where the retailer can adopt 
store brands as a counterstrategy to the manufacturer’s 
online channel. Store brands have been widely 
recognized as a powerful strategy enabling retailers to 
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seek leverage in supply chain coordination (Meza & 
Sudhir, 2010; Mills, 1995; Wu & Wang, 2005). 
However, interesting strategic interactions between the 
manufacturer and the retailer can arise when they both 
engage in a threatening option, pitting the online 
channel against the store brand. Interestingly, 
anecdotal evidence suggests a possible connection 
between the development of online channels and store 
brands. In Europe, for instance, where store brands are 
popular, the size of store brand revenue often 
correlates with the size of online sales. In the European 
market, store brand revenue and online sales are 
highest in the United Kingdom and lowest in Italy. 
Recent decades have witnessed parallel growth of both 
in the United States,1 and the CEO of one of China’s 
largest retail chains acknowledged in an interview that 
differentiating the chain from online stores was one of 
the main reasons they developed store brands.2 
This study investigates the interaction between the 
manufacturer’s channel strategy (i.e., introducing an 
online channel) and the retailer’s product line selection 
strategy (i.e., introducing a store brand). We develop a 
game-theoretical model in which a manufacturer 
makes a channel choice, a retailer selects a product 
line, and then each makes sales. We compare cases in 
which the parties make independent choices to 
explicate how the online channel affects the store 
brand strategy and how the store brand affects the 
online channel strategy, and also identify the 
implications for their respective sales and profits. 
Our findings indicate that if the manufacturer’s online 
channel is very efficient, the retailer will lodge a strong 
defense by introducing a store brand that is not 
efficient enough to be introduced in the absence of an 
online channel. However, when the online channel is 
costly for the manufacturer, the retailer will act 
cooperatively by holding back an otherwise efficient 
store brand. For manufacturers, the introduction of the 
store brand always forces them to give up an otherwise 
efficient online channel. Regarding profit, the retailer 
is always better off with the store brand if the fixed 
development cost is lower than a threshold value, 
whereas the manufacturer sometimes suffers losses 
caused by introducing the online channel.  
In sum, the store brand is an effective strategy that a 
retailer can use to compete against a manufacturer’s 
online channel, but retailers are willing to be more 
cooperative when the online channel is not very 
threatening. This finding may help to explain the 
proliferation of store brands in products that can easily 
be sold online, such as clothes and diapers. In contrast, 
 
1 For store brand sales data, see https://www.iriworldwide. 
com/iri/media/iri-clients/privatelabel_report_final_7jan 
15.pdf and for ecommerce sales data, see https://www. 
statista.com/statistics/185351/share-of-e-commerce-in-total-
value-of-us-retail-wholesale-trade-sales/. 
the manufacturer’s online channel is profitable only 
when it is very efficient. When it is introduced at a loss, 
the manufacturer will aim to neutralize the threat of the 
store brand and expand its market size in the long run. 
This finding might provide an alternative explanation 
for why many manufacturers have an online presence 
even if it generates no significant sales. 
This paper makes several important contributions to 
the literature. The online channel might be the most 
significant development in channel structure in recent 
decades. Store brands are one of the most significant 
product strategies for retailers. We study the 
interaction of the two, thus contributing to the 
literature on store brands and online channels, and 
enrich the literature on online channels and supply 
chain coordination. Going beyond extant studies on 
direct response strategies (e.g., reducing or seeking 
alternative purchases), we examine how store brands 
can be strategically deployed to respond to the threat 
of the online channel. Moreover, our analysis shows 
that the online channel can help mitigate the threat of 
store brands, adding to the discussion about using 
strategic incentives to introduce the online channel 
(e.g., Chiang et al., 2003). Further, we contribute to the 
literature on store brands by investigating how store 
brand strategies change under the influence of online 
channels. Researchers have attempted to identify the 
optimal store brand strategy for different kinds of 
customer, market, and supply chain relationships 
(Chen et al., 2011; Kumar et al., 2010; Wu & Wang, 
2005). Our analysis sheds light on the optimal strategy 
given the threat of the online channel. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
We discuss the related literature and highlight our 
contributions in Section 2. Section 3 describes our 
models and establishes the benchmark cases. Sections 
4 through 6 discuss the equilibrium results of the full 
model. We conclude with a discussion of potential 
future research directions in Section 7. 
2 Literature Review 
Our research is related to two streams of literature 
investigating, respectively, online channels and store 
brand strategies. The literature on online channels has 
examined the impacts, strategies, and counterstrategies 
of the online channel and has found that the online 
channel has a profound impact on the supply chain. 
While the online channel might cause channel conflicts 
by cannibalizing demand from traditional retail 
channels (Alba et al., 1997; Brooker, 1999; 
2 Chinese E-commerce Research Center, “Physical retailers 
introduce store brands to offset the threat from online 
channels,” http://b2b.toocle.com/detail--6351861.html. 
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Deleersnyder et al., 2002; Li et al., 2011), the online 
channel can also benefit the supply chain in various 
ways. Chiang et al. (2003) show that manufacturers 
can benefit from the online channel, even if the channel 
is inefficient and produces no direct sales. The mere 
threat of an online channel can motivate retailers to 
work harder and generate more sales. Arya and 
Mittendorf (2007) show that retailers benefit from the 
manufacturer’s online channel because it causes the 
manufacturer to reduce wholesale prices, thus 
eliminating double marginalization. By considering 
information disclosure (Hao & Tan, 2018), 
Brynjolfsson et al. (2009, 2011) demonstrate that the 
online channel, enabled with the information 
extensiveness and searchability of the internet, can 
efficiently sell niche products to the long tail of 
consumers, thus mitigating retail competition and 
generating higher profits for the supply chain. In 
addition, Chen and Stallaert (2011) consider 
behavioral targeting in online channels, showing that 
this technique can increase social welfare. 
Furthermore, most studies on the optimal strategies of 
online channels have addressed channel conflicts. For 
instance, Tsay and Agrawal (2004) examine various 
sources of inefficiency caused by channel conflicts and 
suggest remedies such as lowering the wholesale price, 
paying the retailer a commission for diverting 
customers to the direct channel, or conceding the 
demand fulfillment function entirely to the retailer in 
order to ease tension. Chen et al. (2008) find that, in 
the presence of service competition, the online channel 
can help manufacturers capture all profits from 
retailers if the retailer’s inconvenience cost is high. 
Dumrongsiri et al. (2008) show that the difference in 
marginal costs between online and retail channels 
plays an important role in deciding whether to adopt 
dual channels. Retailers’ strategies include reducing 
the sales of manufacturers’ products (Bucklin et al., 
1997; Frazier, 1999), introducing their own online 
channel (Hsiao & Chen, 2014), or seeking alternative 
partners (Brooker, 1999). However, retailers can also 
benefit from the introduction of an online channel if 
they implement revenue-sharing contracts with 
manufacturers (Xu et al., 2014). 
The literature on store brands has also explored the 
impacts and optimal strategies of store brands. 
Researchers have found a positive impact of store 
brands on retailers. For instance, Corstjens and Lal 
(2000) show that quality store brands help retailers 
build customer loyalty by increasing switching costs 
for customers, and Sudhir and Talukdar (2004) find 
empirical evidence of higher revenues and profits 
based on the greater breadth of available products. The 
impacts of store brands on manufacturers are more 
complicated. They can be detrimental to manufacturers 
because they give the retailer more bargaining power 
(Meza & Sudhir, 2010) and force lower wholesale 
prices (Rao, 1991). However, they can also benefit 
manufacturers in that they motivate manufacturers to 
improve quality or develop new brands. For instance, 
Pauwels and Srinivasan (2004) show that premium 
national brands profit from store brand entry because 
it allows them to achieve lower long-term price 
sensitivity and higher revenues. 
Many studies have attempted to identify optimal store 
brand strategies when the reactions of supply chain 
partners are taken into account. For instance, Ailawadi 
and Harlam (2004) demonstrate that maintaining a 
balance between store brands and national brands is 
important for enabling retailers to attract and retain the 
most profitable customers. Meza and Sudhir (2010) 
consider the tension between the short-term profit of 
carrying more manufacturer brands and the long-term 
benefits of growing a strong store brand. Chen et al. 
(2011) systematically characterize the conditions 
under which retailers develop store brands. They find 
that store brands are introduced by retailers when the 
ratio between the maximum per-unit margin that can 
be earned from selling the store brand versus that of 
the national brand is above a certain threshold. 
Horowitz (2000) investigate how various factors affect 
store brand introduction, such as cost, quality, required 
shelf space, and retailer and manufacturer margins. In 
general, they find that retailers’ store brand strategies 
seek a delicate balance between manufacturer brands 
and their own store brands that is affected by factors, 
such as consumer characteristics, market structure, 
manufacturer power, and the retailer’s own business 
strategy. 
In addition, various channel structures beyond the 
simple setting of one manufacturer and one retailer 
have been considered by previous studies. For 
instance, using a setup involving two or more 
manufacturers and a common retailer, Raju et al. 
(1995) show that the retailer benefits from the 
introduction of a store brand when the cross-price 
sensitivity among national brands is low and the cross-
price sensitivity between the national brands and the 
store brand is high. Manufacturers are found to be 
better off when providing store brands to their retailers 
(Wu & Wang, 2005) and implementing a cooperative 
advertising program (Karray & Zaccour, 2006). 
Sayman et al. (2002) explore the optimal position 
strategy of the store brands and identify the conditions 
under which the retailer position and the store brand 
are close to the leading national brand both 
theoretically and empirically. Sayman and Raju (2004) 
show that retailers are expected to carry two store 
brands rather than one in categories where two national 
brands are similar in strength and the price sensitivity 
between the national brands is low. 
Researchers have also examined manufacturers’ 
response strategies to store brands. For instance, Mills 
(1999) proposes three counterstrategies for 
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manufacturers: “fighting brands,” nonlinear pricing 
measures, and coupon programs. Dunne and 
Narasimhan (1999) argue that manufacturers can act as 
suppliers of store brands to offset unfavorable effects. 
Groznik and Heese (2010) suggest that manufacturers 
may use long-term contracts to establish a wholesale 
price commitment in order to impede the introduction 
of store brands. Nasser et al. (2013) conclude that 
manufacturers can either adjust their own product lines 
to accommodate or defend the store brand or become 
the store brand supplier. Jin et al. (2017) explore the 
conditions under which either dual-channel or 
exclusive retailer strategy better deter store brand 
entry, finding that, under a flexible wholesale price 
scheme, an exclusive retailer can induce retailers to 
only sell national brands, whereas the dual channel is 
more effective under a uniform wholesale price 
scheme. 
Therefore, both online channel and store brand 
strategies have been shown to be important for supply 
chain dynamics. Their strategic deployment by both 
manufacturers and retailers can create interesting 
interactions. Some researchers have studied online 
channel strategies under the threat of store brand 
introduction. For example, in their study of store brand 
introduction, Amrouche and Yan (2012) examine 
online channels as a manufacturer counterstrategy. 
However, they do not consider the impacts of the 
opposite dynamic, where the retailer’s store brand is 
introduced as a counterstrategy to the manufacturer's 
online channel. Our study is most closely related to Li, 
et al. (2018), but is different in several ways. First, we 
explicitly consider the fixed cost of introducing a store 
brand. While an online channel strategy can be 
introduced without sales because of its relatively low 
cost (Chiang et al., 2003), the introduction of a store 
brand incurs much higher costs and cannot be achieved 
without sales (Chen et al., 2011). Thus, cost should 
play a significant role in determining the store brand 
strategy. Second, we consider both the online channel 
and store brand as strategic moves designed to counter 
each other; therefore, their interaction involves 
strategic competition and forward-looking planning by 
both the retailer and the manufacturer. Li et al. (2018) 
treat the online channel as a secondary response to the 
introduction of a store brand, which might understate 
the strategic significance of online channels, which has 
expanded rapidly in recent years. Third, our model 
incorporates the differences in production and selling 
 
3  The online channel can provide better deals and more 
convenience to consumers than the retailer channel, but it 
lacks the use of touch, taste, smell, or sound in prepurchase 
evaluation. In general, consumer preferences for different 
channels depend on many factors, such as product category, 
urgency of demand, and transportation costs. As consumers 
are becoming increasingly rational, the assumption of 
absolute preference for one channel seems unreasonable. 
costs between national and store brands, which also 
represent important decision factors. Thus, our study 
may be the first to systematically explore the strategic 
interactions between online channels and store brands 
and to examine them as important strategies and 
counterstrategies for supply partners. 
3 Modeling Framework 
We consider a supply chain consisting of a national 
brand and a single retailer. Hereafter, we refer to the 
manufacturer of the national brand as “the 
manufacturer.” The manufacturer sells its national 
brand through the retailer (retail channel), and also has 
the option of building an online channel for the direct 
sales of its own brand. The retailer can develop its own 
store brand in the same product category as the national 
brand. On the demand side, we assume a continuum of 
potential consumers with a total mass of one. Each 
consumer buys, at most, one unit of either the national 
brand or the store brand. We further assume that 
consumers have no channel preference between retail 
and online channels.3 Consumers are heterogeneous in 
their valuation per-unit of product quality, which we 
assume is uniformly distributed on [0,1] across the 
population of consumers.  
As often occurs in practice, the store brand is perceived 
to be of a lower quality than the national brand (Chen 
et al., 2011; Mills, 1995; Narasimhan & Wilcox, 1998; 
Raju et al., 1995). This quality refers to perceived 
quality, which may reflect physical quality, brand 
image, after-sales services, and other factors. We 
normalize the perceived level of quality for the 
national brand to 1; 𝜃 ∈ (0,1), denoting the perceived 
level of quality for the store brand relative to the 
national brand.4 To create a credible threat to a store 
brand, the retailer must incur a fixed development cost, 
which we denote as 𝑔. Developing a store brand incurs 
much higher fixed costs than establishing an online 
channel. Only large retail chains can afford such a 
move. Without loss of generality, we assume no 
production cost for either brand, and we also assume 
that the retailer incurs no operational cost to sell the 
national brand (Amrouche & Yan, 2012).  
Similar to Cai (2010), we assume that the operational 
cost of the online channel is  𝑐𝑑 ∈ [0,1] , and the 
operational cost of introducing the store brand is 𝑐𝑠 ∈
[0, 𝜃]. The operational cost of the online channel can be 
interpreted as the marketing costs and the additional 
Thus, our assumption of no channel preference does not 
affect the primary interest of this study. 
4 𝜃  also refers to product differentiation between the two 
brands or price competition in the market. A higher 𝜃, such 
as a high-quality store brand or one provided by a retailer 
with a good reputation, indicates that the store brand 
constitutes a greater threat to the national brand market. 
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distribution costs incurred to fulfill individual 
consumer orders (instead of distributing a large 
number of products to the retailer directly). The 
operational cost of the store brand includes the costs of 
sourcing production from manufacturers and 
marketing. We assume that these costs, as well as the 
perceived quality level of the private label, 𝜃 , are 
common knowledge to both the manufacturer and the 
retailer. Similar to the analysis of Chen et al. (2011), 
we obtain the inverse demand functions of the national 
brand and the store brand as follows: 
𝑝𝑛(𝑞𝑛, 𝑞𝑠) = 1 − 𝑞𝑛 − 𝜃𝑞𝑠 ,  
𝑝𝑠(𝑞𝑛 , 𝑞𝑠) = 𝜃(1 − 𝑞𝑛 − 𝑞𝑠)  (1) 
where 𝑝𝑛 and 𝑝𝑠  are the market clearing prices when 
the quantities are 𝑞𝑛 and 𝑞𝑠 for the national brand and 
the store brand, respectively. This particular demand 
model is commonly used in the literature to represent 
vertically differentiated products (e.g., Chen et al., 
2011; Mussa & Rosen, 1978; Yehezkel, 2008). 
The timeline of our model is as follows. In the first 
stage, the retailer decides whether to develop a store 
brand capability. Since introducing a store brand is a 
more long-term decision than that of introducing an 
online channel, the retailer should make this decision 
at the very beginning. If the retailer decides to develop 
the store brand, it incurs a fixed cost 𝑔 . Let 𝑒 ∈
{0,1} denote the retailer’s decision. If 𝑒 = 0, the retailer 
does not develop the capability, whereas it does if 𝑒 =
1. In the second stage, the manufacturer observes the 
retailer’s development decision 𝑒 and sets the per-unit 
wholesale price, 𝑤, for the national brand. Finally, in 
stage three, the retailer determines the quantities of the 
national brand, 𝑞𝑟 , and those of the store brand, 𝑞𝑠 , 
while the manufacturer sets the quantity of the national 
brand through the online channel, 𝑞𝑑. Note that.𝑞𝑛 =
𝑞𝑟 + 𝑞𝑑. 
We first consider a base model in which the 
manufacturer distributes the national brand only 
through the retail channel, and the retailer does not sell 
the store brand. We refer to this model as “Scenario R." 
This model can be solved easily using backward 
induction. In equilibrium, the manufacturer charges a 
wholesale price 𝑤𝑅 =
1
2




retailer orders the quantity of the national brand from 













Next, we consider two strategic choices: The retailer 
introduces the store brand (Strategy S), and the 
manufacturer introduces the online channel (Strategy 
D). To understand how the two decisions affect each 
other, we set up the following two scenarios to isolate 
the effect of each decision. In Scenario RS, the retailer 
might exercise Strategy S, while the manufacturer has 
no option for Strategy D. In Scenario RD, the 
manufacturer might exercise Strategy D, while the 
retailer has no option of Strategy S. By comparing 
Scenarios RS and RD to Scenario R, we can isolate the 
impact of either the store brand or the online channel 
on the equilibrium prices and quantities. We then 
analyze Scenario RSD, wherein both parties have the 
option to introduce their relevant strategies. By 
comparing Scenario RSD to Scenario RS, we can 
identify the effect of the manufacturer’s online channel 
on the retailer’s store brand strategy. Similarly, 
comparing Scenario RSD and Scenario RD clarifies 
the impact of the store brand on the manufacturer's 
online channel strategy. The four scenarios are shown 
in Figure 1.
 
Figure 1. Model Framework. 
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3.1 Scenario RS: Store Brand, No Online 
Channel 
In this scenario, a store brand is available for the 
retailer. Once the retailer has incurred a fixed cost to 
develop the store brand, more options are available to 
the retailer in response to the manufacturer. For each 
consumer, three purchasing options are available in the 
market: the national brand from the retailer (𝑟), the 
store brand (𝑠), or leaving without purchasing. The 
timeline is as follows: in Stage 1, the retailer decides 
whether to develop the store brand. In Stage 2, the 
manufacturer observes the retailer’s development 
decision 𝑒 and sets the per-unit wholesale price, 𝑤, for 
the national brand. In Stage 3, the retailer determines 
the quantities of the national brand, 𝑞𝑟, and that of the 
store brand, 𝑞𝑠. We first obtain the equilibrium results 
of subgame 𝑒 = 1, where the store brand is introduced 
and the fixed cost 𝑔 is a sunk cost. We achieve the 
equilibrium outcomes of Scenario RS by comparing 
the equilibrium results of subgame 𝑒 = 1 in Scenario 
RS with those of Scenario R. 
The manufacturer sells the national brand to the retailer 
at a per-unit wholesale price 𝑤. The retailer’s profit is 
given by: 
  𝜋(𝑤, 𝑞𝑟 , 𝑞𝑠) = (𝑝𝑛 − 𝑤)𝑞𝑟 + (𝑝𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠)𝑞𝑠 − 𝑔  
= (1 − 𝑞𝑟 − 𝜃𝑞𝑠 − 𝑤)𝑞𝑟 
+[𝜃(1 − 𝑞𝑟 − 𝑞𝑠)−𝑐𝑠]𝑞𝑠 − 𝑔 (2) 
where 𝑞𝑟  is the sales quantity of the national brand 
through the retail channel and 𝑞𝑠 is the sales quantity 
of the store brand. The quantity can be viewed as the 
result of the retailer’s marketing efforts for each brand. 
The manufacturer’s profit is determined by: 
𝛱(𝑤, 𝑞𝑟 , 𝑞𝑠) = 𝑤𝑞𝑟 (3) 
Let 𝑤𝑅𝑆and (𝑞𝑟
𝑅𝑆, 𝑞𝑠
𝑅𝑆) be the optimal choices of the 
manufacturer and the retailer in Scenario RS without 
considering the fixed cost  𝑔 . We summarize the 
equilibrium in the following lemma: 
Lemma 1. (Subgame 𝑒 = 1 in Scenario RS) When 
there is no manufacturer online channel, the retailer 
always sells the national brand and 









𝑐𝑠 ≤ 𝜃; in which the store brand still affects the 







while has no effect if  
𝜃
2
< 𝑐𝑠 ≤ 𝜃. 
This result confirms the conventional wisdom that the 
store brand will be beneficial to the retailer if, and only 
if, its operational cost is relatively low. When the cost 
is low (0 ≤ 𝑐𝑠 ≤
𝜃(1−𝜃)
2−𝜃
), the retailer enjoys a high profit 
margin from selling the store brand (denoted here as 




< 𝑐𝑠 ≤ 𝜃 ), the retailer sells none of the store 







), the store brand still benefits the 
retailer even though there are no, or only very 
marginal, sales. In this case, the store brand serves as a 
potential threat to the manufacturer and forces the 
manufacturer to make decisions favoring the retailer 
(denoted here as “store brand threat”). The results in 
this scenario explain why store brands are seen mostly 
in fast-moving categories such as food and beverages. 
Their production and operational costs are much lower 
than are those of durable goods, such as furniture. In 




< 𝑐𝑠 ≤ 𝜃, whereas the retailer might introduce the 
store brand 0 ≤ 𝑐𝑠 ≤
𝜃
2
 depending on the fixed 
development cost 𝑔. 
We also find that, when the quality of the store brand 
is very close to that of the national brand, the store 
brand will not be sold even though it is cost effective. 
Rather, the manufacturer will be willing to reduce the 
wholesale price enough to induce the retailer to sell the 
national brand instead of the store brand. To identify 
the profit implications of Strategy S, we summarize the 
comparison of equilibrium results between subgame 
𝑒 = 1 in Scenario RS and Scenario R in Table 1, where 
Π𝑅𝑆 and  𝜋𝑅𝑆 are the optimal profits of the 
manufacturer and the retailer, respectively. 
Table 1. Comparison of Equilibrium Solutions (Scenario RS versus Scenario R): Here, SB Refers to the 
Store Brand, While +, -, and 0 Are Positive, Negative, and Zero, Respectively. 




















, 𝜃] No SB Sales 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 




Figure 2. Equilibrium Solutions of Scenario RS when 𝒈 < ?̃?, Where SB Refers to the Store Brand, and the 
National Brand Is Always Distributed by the Retailer with Positive Sales  
(Refer to Table 1 for Regions I, II, and III). 
As Table 1 shows, even if the store brand is merely a 
threat with no or very marginal sales, the manufacturer 
still lowers the wholesale price (𝑤𝑅𝑆 ) to encourage 
more sales through the retailer ( 𝑞𝑟
𝑅𝑆 ) because the 
retailer could sell the national brand at a lower retail 
price (𝑝𝑛
𝑅𝑆 ). However, the increase in sales cannot 
mitigate the negative effect of the reduced wholesale 
price, and thus the manufacturer’s profit ( Π𝑅𝑆 ) 
decreases. The results are summarized in the following 
lemma: 
Lemma 2. (Subgame 𝑒 = 1 in Scenario RS vs. 
Scenario R) Given no online channel, the 
introduction of the store brand or the attempt to 
introduce it reduces the wholesale price of the 
national brand and lowers the manufacturer’s 
profit. 
The retailer’s optimal decision on store brand 
development depends on the value of the fixed 
development cost 𝑔. Let us define ∆𝑅𝑆= 𝛱𝑅𝑆 − 𝛱𝑅 as 
representing the increase in the retailer’s net income as 
a result of developing a store brand capability. 
Obviously, the retailer develops the store brand 
capability if and only if ∆𝑅𝑆> 𝑔 . We conclude our 
outcomes in the following lemma and illustrate the 
results in Figure 2: 
Lemma 3. (Scenario RS) The optimal solution to the 
problem of store brand development for the retailer 
can be characterized in terms of a threshold, ?̃? , 
such that the retailer develops the store brand (𝑒 =
1) if and only if 𝑔 < ?̃?, and: 







𝜃 , the store brand is not developed (𝑒 = 0 ) 







, it is developed but not 
sold when 𝑔 < ?̃?. 
3. When 0 ≤ 𝑐𝑠 ≤
𝜃(1−𝜃)
2−𝜃
, it is developed and sold 
in a positive quantity when 𝑔 < ?̃?. 
Lemma 3 shows that the fixed cost of developing the 
store brand capability plays a role in the retailer’s 
brand choice when it is relatively high ( 𝑔 ≥ ?̃? ). 
Specifically, if 𝑔 ≥ ?̃?, the retailer will not introduce the 
store brand because the gains cannot cover the setup 
cost. When it is relatively low (𝑔 < ?̃?), it has no effect 
on the equilibrium outcomes. 
3.2 Scenario RD: Online Channel, No 
Store Brand 
The manufacturer’s channel choice depends on the 
operational cost (𝑐𝑑) of the online channel. For each 
consumer, three purchasing options are available in the 
market: purchasing the national brand from the retailer 
(r), purchasing the national brand from the online 
channel (d), or leaving without purchasing. The 
timeline is as follows: in Stage 1, the manufacturer sets 
the per-unit wholesale price, w, for the national brand; 
In Stage 2, the retailer selects the quantities of the 
national brand, 𝑞𝑟, while the manufacturer decides the 
quantity of the national brand through the online 
channel, 𝑞𝑑. 
The manufacturer supplies the retailer at a wholesale 
price w, and the retailer chooses its profit-maximizing 
retail output 𝑞𝑟 to maximize its own profit. 
  𝜋(𝑤, 𝑞𝑟 , 𝑞𝑑) = (𝑝𝑛 − 𝑤)𝑞𝑟 
             = (1 − 𝑞𝑟 − 𝑞𝑑 − 𝑤)𝑞𝑟 (4) 
The manufacturer decides on the sales quantity of the 
national brand for the online channel, 𝑞𝑑. Its profit is 
determined by: 
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Π(𝑤, 𝑞𝑟 , 𝑞𝑑) = 𝑤𝑞𝑟 + (𝑝𝑛 − 𝑐𝑑)𝑞𝑑 
= 𝑤𝑞𝑟 + (1 − 𝑞𝑟 − 𝑞𝑑 − 𝑐𝑑)𝑞𝑑 (5) 
Let  (𝑤𝑅𝐷 , 𝑞𝑑
𝑅𝐷)  and  𝑞𝑟
𝑅𝐷  be the optimal strategies for 
the manufacturer and the retailer, respectively. 
Performing the maximization in Equations (4) and (5) 
at the same time, we obtain three groups of solutions. 
The manufacturer’s channel choice is summarized in 
the following lemma: 
Lemma 4. (Scenario RD) When there is no store 
brand, given the operational cost 𝑐𝑑  of the online 
channel, the manufacturer 
1. sells the national brand through the online 




2. introduces the online channel but does not 






3. does not introduce the online channel if  3
4
<
𝑐𝑑 ≤ 1. 
The online channel is adopted and positive sales are 
made when the operational cost is low ( 0 ≤ 𝑐𝑑 ≤
5
7
)(denoted here as “online channel entry”), and not 
adopted when the cost is high (
3
4
< 𝑐𝑑 ≤ 1). The results 
might explain why products with low distribution 
costs, such as apparel and certain electronic products, 
are more likely to adopt the online channel. When the 






), the online channel can 
be implemented to intimidate the retailer, even if it 
generates zero or marginal sales (denoted here as 
“online channel threat”). 
Similarly, we compare the equilibrium of Scenario RD 
with that of Scenario R. The results, summarized in 
Table 2, show that the wholesale price of the national 
brand is always lower after the introduction of the 
online channel. Because the online channel 
cannibalizes demand from the retailer, the 
manufacturer needs to lower its wholesale price to 
encourage the retailer to order more product. This 
result aligns with the findings of Arya and Mittendorf 
(2007). Moreover, the manufacturer benefits from 
introducing the online channel only when the 
operational cost is very low (0 ≤ 𝑐𝑑 ≤
10−√10
18
). In this 
case, the manufacturer’s profit increases because the 
profit gain from the online channel is larger than the 
profit loss from the retail channel. When the online 







online profit cannot cover the loss from the retail 
channel, leading to less profit for the manufacturer 
than would have been obtained without the online 
option (Scenario R).  
Table 2. Comparison of Equilibrium Solutions (Scenario RD versus Scenario R): Here, OC Refers to the 
Online Channel, While +, −, and 0 Are Positive, Negative, and Zero, Respectively. 


































, 1] No OC Sales 0 0 0 0 0 







channel sales can increase because the manufacturer 
has to encourage retail channel sales with an even 
lower wholesale price to compensate for the low sales 
of the online channel. As for the retailer, when the 







), the retailer’s profit increases 
because of the lower wholesale prices and greater 
sales. We summarize the results in Lemma 5: 
Lemma 5. (Scenario RD) Given no store brand: 
1. the online channel cannibalizes demand from 
the retail channel (𝑞𝑟
𝑅𝐷 < 𝑞𝑟
𝑅 ) and lowers the 
retailer’s profit (𝜋𝑅
𝑅𝐷 < 𝜋𝑅
𝑅) in equilibrium when 




2. the retailer’s profit increases ( 𝜋𝑅
𝑅𝐷 > 𝜋𝑅
𝑅 ) in 








As Lemma 5 suggests, introducing an online channel 
does not necessarily benefit the manufacturer because 
the online channel creates competition with the retail 
channel, which is also a source of profit for the 
manufacturer. A price war may squeeze the 
manufacturer’s profit margins from both channels. In 
fact, as Table 2 shows, a consistent drop occurs in both 
the wholesale and retail prices of the national brand. 
Furthermore, because of the drop in the national 
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brand’s wholesale price, we see that retail channel 
sales decrease only when 0 < 𝑐𝑑 ≤
5
8 
. Thus, we 
conclude that only an online channel with sufficiently 
low cost benefits the manufacturer and that the retailer 
might benefit from an online channel with a relatively 
high cost because of the drop in the wholesale price. 
3.3 Scenario RSD: Store Brand vs. 
Online Channel 
In this scenario, the retailer decides whether to 
introduce the store brand and the manufacturer decides 
whether to introduce the online channel. We first 
obtain the equilibrium results of subgame 𝑒 = 1. Then 
the store brand is introduced, and the fixed cost g is 
presented as a sunk cost. By comparing the equilibrium 
results of subgame 𝑒 = 1 in Scenario RSD with those 
of Scenario RD, we finally achieve the equilibrium 
outcomes of Scenario RSD. Given the wholesale price 
w of the national brand, the retailer’s profit is 
determined by: 
𝜋(𝑤, 𝑞𝑟 , 𝑞𝑠 , 𝑞𝑑) = (𝑝𝑛 − 𝑤)𝑞𝑟 + (𝑝𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠)𝑞𝑠 − 𝑔 
                      = (1 − 𝑞𝑟 − 𝜃𝑞𝑠 − 𝑞𝑑 − 𝑤)𝑞𝑟 
+[𝜃(1 − 𝑞𝑟 − 𝑞𝑠 − 𝑞𝑑)−𝑐𝑠]𝑞𝑠 − 𝑔 (6) 
and the manufacturer’s profit is: 
Π(𝑤, 𝑞𝑟 , 𝑞𝑠 , 𝑞𝑑) = 𝑤𝑞𝑟 + (𝑝𝑛 − 𝑐𝑑)𝑞𝑑 
      = 𝑤𝑞𝑟 + (1 − 𝑞𝑟 − 𝜃𝑞𝑠 − 𝑞𝑑 − 𝑐𝑑)𝑞𝑑        (7) 
Let ( 𝑤𝑅𝑆𝐷 , 𝑞𝑑
𝑅𝑆𝐷) and (𝑞𝑟
𝑅𝑆𝐷 , 𝑞𝑠
𝑅𝑆𝐷)  be the optimal 
choices of the manufacturer and the retailer, 
respectively. Performing optimization in Equations (6) 
and (7), we generate eight groups of equilibrium 
solutions depending on the range of the parameters 𝑐𝑠  
and 𝑐𝑑. We summarize the equilibrium in Lemma 6:  
Lemma 6. (Subgame 𝑒 = 1 in Scenario RSD) When 
the manufacturer has the option of introducing the 
online channel and the retailer has the option of 
introducing the store brand, the equilibria can be 
summarized as follows: 
1. There exist two threshold values 𝑓1(𝜃, 𝑐𝑠) and 
𝑓2(𝜃, 𝑐𝑠) of the channel operational cost 𝑐𝑑 , 
such that the manufacturer 
a. introduces the online channel and sells in 
positive quantity if  0 ≤ 𝑐𝑑 ≤ 𝑓1(𝜃, 𝑐𝑠); 
b. introduces the online channel but sells in 
zero quantity if  𝑓1(𝜃, 𝑐𝑠) < 𝑐𝑑 ≤ 𝑓2(𝜃, 𝑐𝑠); 
and 
c. does not introduce the online channel if 
 𝑓2(𝜃, 𝑐𝑠) < 𝑐𝑑 ≤ 1. 
2. There exist two threshold values ℎ1(𝜃, 𝑐𝑑)  and 
 ℎ2(𝜃, 𝑐𝑑), such that the retailer 
a. sells the store brand in positive quantity if 
 0 ≤ 𝑐𝑠 ≤ ℎ1(𝜃, 𝑐𝑑); 
b. sells the store brand in zero quantity 
if   ℎ1(𝜃, 𝑐𝑑) < 𝑐𝑠 ≤ 𝜃 ; in which the store 
brand impacts the manufacturer if 
 ℎ1(𝜃, 𝑐𝑑) < 𝑐𝑠 ≤  ℎ2(𝜃, 𝑐𝑑)  but has no 
effect on the manufacturer if ℎ2(𝜃, 𝑐𝑑) <
𝑐𝑠 ≤ 𝜃. 
The lemma suggests that the retailer never introduces 
the store brand if ℎ2(𝜃, 𝑐𝑑) < 𝑐𝑠 ≤ 𝜃. (We will provide 
more specific conditions for store brand introduction 
in Section 6.) Thus, when both parties make moves, 
their options interact with each other. The threshold 
values 𝑓1(𝜃, 𝑐𝑠) and 𝑓2(𝜃, 𝑐𝑠) of the channel operational 
cost 𝑐𝑑  are functions of the store brand operational cost 
𝑐𝑠, while the threshold values ℎ1(𝜃, 𝑐𝑑) and  ℎ2(𝜃, 𝑐𝑑) 
of the store brand operational cost 𝑐𝑠  are also functions 
of the channel operational cost 𝑐𝑑.The results indicate 
that the relative efficiency of the two choices 
determines the manufacturer’s and retailer’s decisions. 
First, we examine the impact of the store brand when 
the manufacturer operates the online channel. We 
focus on situations in which the store brand does not 
have a large quality gap with the national brand and the 
retailer introduces the store brand (𝜃 ∈ (
10
37
, 1)). This 
assumption is reasonable because store brands usually 
do not aim for extremely low-end quality. Retailers 
often offer comparatively high-quality products 
(Quelch & Harding, 1996; IRi, 2015). Proposition 1 
can be directly derived from a comparison between 
scenarios. 
Proposition 1. (Subgame 𝑒 = 1 in Scenario RSD vs. 
Scenario RD) When the store brand is introduced 
(0 ≤ 𝑐𝑠 ≤ 𝑔2(𝜃, 𝑐𝑑)), the retailer always earns a 
higher profit, while the manufacturer suffers profit 
loss. 
The profit comes from two sources. First, the market 
expands to include customers with lower evaluation 
while still maintaining a segment with high evaluation. 
Second, as the retailer’s bargaining power increases, 
the retailer can negotiate for a lower wholesale price 
from the manufacturer. Consequently, the retailer can 
lower the price, thus undercutting the manufacturer’s 
profit from the online channel. In this case, the 
manufacturer has not only lowered the wholesale price 
but also earns less from the online channel. 
Next, we examine the retailer’s optimal decision on 
store brand development in Scenario RSD. Let us 
define ∆𝑅𝑆𝐷= Π𝑅𝑆𝐷 −Π𝑅𝐷  as the increase in the 
retailer’s net income as a result of the retailer’s 
development of a store brand capability. Obviously, 
the retailer develops the store brand capability if and 
only if ∆𝑅𝑆𝐷≥ 𝑔 . We summarize the results in the 
following lemma and illustrate them in Figure 3: 
Lemma 7. (Scenario RSD) The optimal solution to the 
problem of store brand development for the retailer 
can be characterized in terms of a threshold, ?̅? , 
such that the retailer develops the store brand (𝑒 =
1) if and only if 𝑔 < ?̅?, and: 
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1. ?̅? ≥ 0 if and only if  0 ≤ 𝑐𝑠 ≤ ℎ2(𝜃, 𝑐𝑑). When 
ℎ2(𝜃, 𝑐𝑑) < 𝑐𝑠 ≤ 𝜃 , the store brand is not 
developed (𝑒 = 0) regardless of development 
cost 𝑔. 
2. When  ℎ1(𝜃, 𝑐𝑑) < 𝑐𝑠 ≤  ℎ2(𝜃, 𝑐𝑑), it is developed 
but not sold when 𝑔 < ?̅?. 
3. When 0 ≤ 𝑐𝑠 ≤ ℎ1(𝜃, 𝑐𝑑) , it is developed and 
sold in a positive quantity when 𝑔 < ?̅?. 
Similar to Scenario RS, Lemma 7 shows that the fixed 
cost of developing the store brand capability plays a 
role in the retailer’s brand choice when it is relatively 
high (𝑔 ≥ ?̅?). Specifically, if 𝑔 ≥ ?̅?, then the retailer 
will not introduce the store brand because the gains 
cannot cover its setup cost. When it is relatively low 
(𝑔 < ?̅?), it has no effect on the equilibrium outcomes. 
To better understand the cases in Scenario RSD, we 
conduct a numerical study and present it in Section 6. 
Specifically, we intend to show the effect of store 
brand quality on the equilibrium results and to reveal 
the properties of the threshold of the fixed cost of 
introducing the store brand.
 
Figure 3. Equilibrium Solutions of Scenario RSD when 𝒈 < ?̅?, Where SB refers to the Store Brand and OC 
Refers to the Online Channel (see Table A4 in the Appendix for Regions I to VIII). 
 
Figure 4. Equilibrium Comparison Between Scenario RS and Scenario RSD (𝜽 = 𝟎. 𝟓). 
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4 Impact of Channel Choice on 
Product Line Selection 
Comparing equilibrium results between Scenario RSD 
to Scenario RS allows us to identify how the 
introduction of the online channel shifts the store brand 
strategy.  
Figure 4 shows the boundary condition comparison 
when the fixed cost of developing a store brand 
capability is 𝑔 < 𝑚𝑖𝑛[?̃?, ?̅?]. If 𝑔 ≥ 𝑚𝑖𝑛[?̃?, ?̅?], it would 
be meaningless to compare the boundary conditions 
since at least one scenario would not include the store 
brand choice. Thus, we summarize the effect of the 
online channel on the retailer’s store brand strategy 
when 𝑔 < 𝑚𝑖𝑛[?̃?, ?̅?] in the following proposition: 
Proposition 2: When 𝑔 < 𝑚𝑖𝑛[?̃?, ?̅?], the retailer’s store 
brand strategy changes with the introduction of the 
online channel (0 ≤ 𝑐𝑑 ≤ 𝑓1(𝜃, 𝑐𝑠)). When  0 ≤ 𝑐𝑑 ≤
𝜃
4−2𝜃
, the barrier of store brand entry decreases 




𝑓1(𝜃, 𝑐𝑠), the barrier of store brand entry increases 
(introduced at lower 𝑐𝑠). 
As shown in Figure 4a, the boundary condition for 
store brand entry rotates at Point T from Scenario RS 
(dashed blue line) to Scenario RSD (solid blue line). 
When the online channel is very efficient (0 ≤ 𝑐𝑑 ≤
𝜃
4−2𝜃
), the threshold for introducing the store brand is 
higher than it would have been without the online 
channel (to the left of Point T). This result suggests that 
the retailer is forced to compete with the online channel 
with a store brand that is not sufficiently efficient to be 
introduced in the original setting. The highly cost- 
effective online channel cannibalizes demand and 
threatens to make the retailer rely more on the store 




< 𝑐𝑑 ≤ 𝑓1(𝜃, 𝑐𝑠); 𝑓1(𝜃, 𝑐𝑠) is the red 
line shown in Figure 4), the threshold for introducing 
the store brand is lower than it would be without the 
online channel.  
This result shows that the retailer is willing to 
cooperate by holding off on the store brand entry, even 
if it is profitable in Scenario RS. In this case, the 
retailer seeks to back off somewhat from the 
competition because the manufacturer will then offer a 
better wholesale price, which will cause the profit 
margin from selling the national brand to exceed that 
from selling the store brand. In sum, if the threat of the 
online channel is severe, the retailer would have no 
choice but to fight back with a less cost-effective store 
brand; however, it would act cooperatively and 
withdraw a profitable store brand before the 
manufacturer introduced the online channel. The less 
cost effective the online channel, the more the 
manufacturer and retailer have to act cooperatively. 
We also examine the situation involving a store brand 
threat. As shown in Figure 4b, the boundary condition 
for the retailer to introduce the store brand as a pure 
threat tilts downward from Scenario RS (dashed blue 
line) to Scenario RSD (solid blue line). This result 
suggests that the cost of the store brand should be 
lower than it would be in the no online channel 
situation if it were to be introduced: In other words, the 
retailer refrains from introducing a store brand threat. 
Even as a pure threat, the online channel forces the 
retailer to become more cooperative. 
When 𝑔 > 𝑚𝑖𝑛[?̃?, ?̅?], we would expect the boundaries 
of the store brand entry/threat in Scenario RS to move 
down if 𝑔 > ?̅?; we would expect the same in Scenario 
RSD if 𝑔 > ?̅?. If 𝑔 is sufficiently large, the retailer will 
never develop a store brand capability under all 
conditions of 𝜃, 𝑐𝑠 and 𝑐𝑑 in either scenario. When the 
boundaries of the store brand entry/threat in Scenarios 
RS and RSD move in the same direction, we compare 
the relative speeds of their movements, which are 
related to the comparison between the retailer’s profits 
in Scenarios RS and RSD. In what follows, we examine 
the impact of the online channel on the manufacturer’s 
and retailer’s respective profits when the retailer offers 
the store brand. We summarize the results in 
Proposition 3: 
Proposition 3: The manufacturer is not necessarily 
more profitable with an online channel. 
Specifically, when the online channel’s operational 
cost is moderate ( 𝑓3(𝜃, 𝑐𝑠) < 𝑐𝑑 ≤ 𝑓2(𝜃, 𝑐𝑠) ), the 
manufacturer suffers even when introducing the 
online channel. However, the retailer is more 
profitable if the online channel’s operational cost is 
moderate (𝑓4(𝜃, 𝑐𝑠) < 𝑐𝑑 ≤ 𝑓2(𝜃, 𝑐𝑠)). 
Based on Proposition 3, we know that 𝜋𝑅𝑆𝐷 ≤ 𝜋𝑅𝑆  when 
0 ≤ 𝑐𝑑 ≤ 𝑓4(𝜃, 𝑐𝑠)  and 𝜋
𝑅𝑆𝐷 > 𝜋𝑅𝑆  when 𝑓4(𝜃, 𝑐𝑠) <
𝑐𝑑 ≤ 𝑓2(𝜃, 𝑐𝑠). The online channel cannibalizes demand 
from the retailer by lowering the price and thus induces 
price competition, which reduces the profits of both the 
retailer and manufacturer. In addition, the retailer would 
respond to the online channel by selling more of the 
store brand, so the manufacturer would also lose sales in 
the retail channel. Therefore, the manufacturer could 
even suffer a loss if the online channel is not sufficiently 
cost effective. We need to understand why the 
manufacturer would introduce the online channel at a 
loss. If the online channel is a viable choice for the 
manufacturer, the retailer takes into account the 
potential threat, regardless of whether the manufacturer 
introduces it. Depending on how cost effective the 
online channel is, the retailer will reduce its inventory 
level of the national brand accordingly. Being aware of 
the response, the manufacturer will have no choice but 
to introduce the online channel to compensate for the 
sales loss to a certain extent. In addition, the online 
channel always helps with the market expansion of the 
national brand, as suggested in Proposition 4: 
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Proposition 4: If the online channel is introduced (0 ≤
𝑐𝑑 ≤ 𝑓2(𝜃, 𝑐𝑠) ), the sales of the national brand 
always increase relative to the sales in Scenario RS. 
The retail price of the national brand is always lower 
when an online channel exists, thus leading to an 
increase in sales. Even if the online channel does not 
generate sales, the retailer takes the threat into 
consideration and counters the cannibalization by 
lowering the price and selling more. Expanding the 
market might lead to additional future profits for the 
manufacturer. Therefore, the manufacturer has 
incentives to operate the online channel even if it is not 
profitable. This finding might explain the widespread 
introduction of manufacturer online channels despite 
their limited sales, especially regarding products for 
which store brands are popular. 
5 Impact of Product Line Selection 
on Channel Choice 
In this section, we compare Scenario RSD to Scenario 
RD to identify how the store brand impacts the online 
channel strategy. Figure 5 shows the boundary 
condition comparison when the fixed cost is 𝑔 < ?̅?. If 
𝑔 ≥ ?̅? , the equilibrium results of Scenario RSD are 
exactly the same as those of Scenario RD. Thus, we 
summarize the impact of the store brand on the 
manufacturer’s online channel strategy when 𝑔 < ?̅? in 
the following proposition: 
Proposition 5. When 𝑔 < ?̅? , the barrier of online 
channel entry increases with the introduction of the 
store brand (0 ≤ 𝑐𝑠 ≤ 𝑔2(𝜃, 𝑐𝑑)). 
Figure 5 shows the changes in boundary conditions for 
both the online channel entry and online channel threat 
strategies ( 𝑔2(𝜃, 𝑐𝑑)  is the solid red line). The 
operational cost of the online channel (the solid blue 
line) is lower than that in Scenario RD (dashed blue 
line) for both the online channel entry and online 
channel threat. In addition, as the store brand becomes 
more cost effective, the online channel needs to be 
more cost effective if it is to be introduced. This result 
suggests that the online channel becomes less 
threatening to the retailer when the store brand enters 
the market. From the retailer’s point of view, the 
manufacturer takes a weaker position, indicating that 
the manufacturer intends to opt for cooperation. 
Moreover, the room for cooperation increases as the 
store brand becomes more cost effective. The 
manufacturer has less strategic flexibility in fighting 
against the store brand than the retailer has against the 
online channel. When a store brand poses a threat, the 
manufacturer always seeks to cooperate by abandoning 
the online channel that could be viable in Scenario RD. 
The manufacturer and retailer face choices of a 
different nature: The retailer seeks to introduce a new 
brand, while the manufacturer seeks to launch a new 
channel for the existing brand. By introducing a new 
brand, the retailer targets a new customer segment that 
has not yet been served, whereas the manufacturer only 
cannibalizes demand from the retailer in the existing 
customer group. Therefore, the manufacturer’s 
strategic position is weaker than that of the retailer. 
 
Figure 5. Equilibrium Comparison Between Scenario RD and Scenario RSD (𝜽 = 𝟎. 𝟓). 




Figure 6. Equilibrium Solutions of Scenario RSD with Different 𝜽. 
 
Figure 7. Threshold Value of the Fixed Cost ?̅? with Different 𝜽. 
6 Numerical Study 
In this section, we conduct a numerical study to 
analyze the sensitivity of store brand quality on the 
equilibrium of Scenario RSD, and further examine the 
fixed cost threshold of the store brand introduction in 
Scenario RSD. Figure 6 shows that the regions of the 
store brand threat (IV and V) expand while the regions 
of store brand entry (I, II, and III) shrink as store brand 
quality (𝜃 ) increases. In particular, when the store 
brand is of the exact same quality as the national brand 
(𝜃 = 1), in equilibrium, the store brand would never be 
sold but would be introduced merely as a threat to the 
manufacturer when the store brand is relatively cost 
effective (i.e., the operational cost of the store brand 
channel is low). This counterintuitive result occurs 
because the manufacturer tends to offer more favorable 
terms (a lower wholesale price of the national brand) 
when a higher-quality and relatively cost-effective 
store brand is introduced, which makes selling the 
national brand more attractive to the retailer than 
selling its own brand. Thus, the store brand would be 
introduced but not sold. However, these outcomes are 
all based on the condition that the fixed development 
cost is lower than a threshold value (𝑔 < ?̅?); otherwise, 
the store brand would never be developed by the 
retailer. 
We also analyze the relationship between the fixed cost 
threshold and the cost effectiveness of the online 
channel. A higher threshold (?̅?) means that the store 
brand is more attractive to the retailer since it can bear 
a higher setup cost for the store brand. The results are 
shown in Figure 7. Figure 7 shows the relationship 
between the threshold (?̅?) and the cost of the online 
channel (𝑐𝑑) with different levels of store brand quality 
(θ) and the cost effectiveness of the store brand (𝑐𝑠) . 
From Lemma 7, we know that the store brand would 
never be introduced when 𝑐𝑠 ∈[ 𝜃/2, 𝜃 ] regardless of 
the fixed cost g. Thus, we consider only condition 𝑐𝑠 ∈
 [0, 𝜃/2].  
First, we observe that the fixed development cost 
threshold first increases, then drops, then increases 
again, and finally stays constant as the cost 
effectiveness of the online channel increases. This 
tendency does not change with different θ and 𝑐𝑠 
values. Most interesting is the drop and subsequent 
increase, which conflict with the intuition that the 
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threshold would increase along with the operational 
cost of the online channel. This intuition is true when 
an online channel is introduced with positive sales. 
When the online channel is introduced as merely a 
threat (with zero sales), ?̅?  first decreases and then 
increases with 𝑐𝑑. This shows that while introducing 
the online channel as a threat to the retailer, the 
manufacturer offers a lower wholesale price for the 
national brand to make the store brand less attractive 
to the retailer. The manufacturer’s willingness to do so 
increases along with the operational cost of its own 
online channel (𝑐𝑑) when 𝑐𝑑 is below a threshold. If 𝑐𝑑  
is greater than the threshold, the manufacturer’s 
willingness to offer a lower wholesale price diminishes 
as the store brand is powerful enough to fight against 
the online channel threat. We also find that, if the store 
brand is relatively cost effective (𝑐𝑠/θ is low), the store 
brand is the most attractive to the retailer (maximum 
?̅?) at a relatively low operational cost of the online 
channel, compared to the case when the store brand is 
not that cost effective (𝑐𝑠/θ is high). 
7 Conclusion 
We study a supply chain involving a manufacturer who 
might distribute through a retailer and/or through its 
own online channel, and a retailer who sells a national 
brand and/or sells its own store brand. We first 
examine the manufacturer’s decision to adopt the 
online channel and the retailer’s choice to launch a 
store brand separately. We then look at the strategic 
interaction in an integrated model where both 
decisions are possible. By comparing the equilibrium 
strategies of the models, we identify how the online 
channel impacts store brand strategies and vice versa. 
We find that the retailer chooses between two types of 
responses depending on how cost effective the online 
channel is. When the online channel is extremely cost 
effective, the retailer fights back with a store brand that 
is not cost effective enough to be introduced when 
there is no threat to the online channel. The 
competition is aggravated. As the online channel 
becomes less cost effective, the retailer gives up a store 
brand that would have been profitable. These results 
suggest that the retailer will execute more defensive 
strategies if the threat of the online channel is severe 
but shows a cooperative tendency when the threat is 
less alarming. Therefore, the online channel helps to 
mitigate the threat of the store brand to some extent. 
For the manufacturer, we find that, if a store brand is 
introduced, the manufacturer will always act 
cooperatively by giving up an online channel that is 
cost effective enough before giving up the store brand. 
The manufacturer’s position is weaker than the 
retailer’s because the online channel cannibalizes the 
existing market, while the store brand expands it. The 
store brand serves as an effective retailer strategy for 
managing the threat of the online channel. 
Moreover, the store brand always helps the retailer to 
achieve greater profits, whereas introducing the online 
channel does not necessarily benefit the manufacturer 
and can even result in profit loss. However, the market 
size expands in all cases. Thus, the manufacturer might 
introduce an online channel at a loss to expand the 
market size, especially under the threat of the store 
band. These results provide an alternative perspective 
on why manufacturers set up nonprofitable online 
channels and why store brands have been growing 
rapidly in recent years. 
Our study clarifies the strategic interaction between 
two important channel strategies in the supply chain, 
thus contributing to the literature on online channels 
and store brands. However, we acknowledge several 
limitations. First, we use a parsimonious setting that 
has only one manufacturer and one retailer to clearly 
capture the main cases while eliminating other 
unnecessary effects. More advanced settings could be 
developed to examine this question. For instance, 
instead of examining a single retailer, horizontal 
competition between two retailers might be examined. 
Second, we assume that the quality of the store brand 
is lower than the quality of the national brand to show 
the unique property of the store brand. In reality, 
retailers have been developing multitier store brands 
with differentiated quality levels. Offering cheaper but 
lower-quality goods may no longer be the only store 
brand strategy. In addition to the quality difference, 
introducing or holding store brands may imply other 
unique properties, such as essential channel power, 
unique ownership, or the additional benefits of 
customer loyalty. Third, for the sake of simplicity, we 
consider only costs as the main factor in differentiating 
between the efficiency of the online channel and that 
of the store brand. We do not include consumer 
preferences, although consumers might prefer a certain 
channel or a store brand. We also ignore the increased 
market size with the online channel, which would 
influence our results. Hopefully, these issues will be 
addressed in future research. 
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Appendix B: Proof 
Proof of Lemma 1 
In this scenario, the sequence of the game is as follows: in Stage 1, the manufacturer observes the retailer’s 
development decision 𝑒 and sets the per-unit wholesale price, 𝑤 , for the national brand. In Stage 2, the retailer 
determines the quantities of the national brand, 𝑞𝑟, and that of the store brand, 𝑞𝑠. 




𝜋(𝑤, 𝑞𝑟 , 𝑞𝑠) = (𝑝𝑛 − 𝑤)𝑞𝑟 + (𝑝𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠)𝑞𝑠 − 𝑔  (A1) 
The Hessian matrix of  𝜋(𝑤, 𝑞𝑟 , 𝑞𝑠) is given by 𝐻 = (
−2 −2𝜃
−2𝜃 −2𝜃
). Because  𝐻11 = −2 < 0 and |𝐻| = 4𝜃(1 − 𝜃) >
0, the Hessian matrix of 𝜋(𝑤, 𝑞𝑟 , 𝑞𝑠)  is a negative definite for all values of 𝑞𝑟 and 𝑞𝑠. Hence 𝜋(𝑤, 𝑞𝑟 , 𝑞𝑠)  is strictly 










In stage 1, the manufacturer decides on the wholesale price 𝑤. 
max 
𝑤
Π(𝑤, 𝑞𝑟 , 𝑞𝑠) = 𝑤𝑞𝑟       𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑞𝑟 , 𝑞𝑠 ≥ 0.   (A2) 
If the constraints  𝑞𝑟 , 𝑞𝑠 ≥ 0 are satisfied, we obtain the conditions of parameters and as 𝑤 follows. 
1. When  
𝑐𝑠
𝜃
< 𝑤 ≤ 1 − 𝜃 + 𝑐𝑠  , the equilibrium sale quantities in Stage 2 are functions of 𝑤: 
  𝑞𝑟(𝑤) =
1−𝜃+𝑐𝑠−𝑤
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In sum, we have 
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(A3) 
Since 𝑞𝑟(𝑤)  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑞𝑠(𝑤) have different values depending on the range of 𝑤, we first discuss local optimal solutions of 
𝑤 and then arrive at the global optimal solutions of our model. Now, we construct our piecewise profit function for 
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(A5) 
We then perform the second-order derivative of Equation (A5) relative to 𝑤 to confirm its concavity and have 
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(A6) 
We can clearly derive the optimal wholesale price from Function (A5) and then obtain the global optimal wholesale 
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(A7) 
In summary, three groups of optimal solutions, depending on the range of 𝑐𝑠, have been solved (see Table A1). 
 
Table Al. Equilibrium Outcomes of Scenario RS 
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Proof of Lemma 2 
We first compare the wholesale price in Scenario R with that in Scenario RS. From Table A1, we have  




































= 𝑤𝑅.  
Thus, we conclude that, given no online channel, the introduction of the store brand by the retailer reduces the 
wholesale price of the national brand in equilibrium. Then, we compare the manufacturer’s profits in different scenarios 
as follows: 






































Thus, we conclude that, given no online channel, the introduction of the store brand by the retailer lowers the profit of 
the manufacturer in equilibrium. 





Proof of Lemma 3 
Taking into account the fixed development cost 𝑔, the retailer’s optimal store brand development decision is obtained 
by comparing the profit in Scenario R with that in Scenario RS. Thus, if and only if 𝜋𝑅𝑆 − 𝜋𝑅 > 𝑔, the retailer develops 
the store brand. When 
𝜃
2
< 𝑐𝑠 ≤ 𝜃, the store brand has no effect on retailer's profit, and thus the retailer does not develop 
it regardless of 𝑔. When 0 ≤ 𝑐𝑠 ≤
𝜃
2




























If 𝑔 < ?̃?, the increase in profit with store brand more than offsets the fixed cost 𝑔, and thus the retailer develops the 
store brand; otherwise, the retailer does not. Similarly, we can derive the rest of the results by combining the results 
from our earlier sections. 
Proof of Lemma 4 
In this scenario, the sequence of the game is as follows: in Stage 1, the manufacturer observes the retailer’s 
development decision 𝑒  and sets the per-unit wholesale price, 𝑤 , for the national brand. In Stage 2, the retailer 
determines the quantities of the national brand, 𝑞𝑟, while the manufacturer sets the quantity of the national brand 
through online channel, 𝑞𝑑. 
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(A8) 
Then, we solve the optimal condition of ?̃?𝑑 in Equation (5) as follows: 
?̃?𝑑(𝑤) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔max
𝑞𝑑≥0
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(A9) 
Substituting Equations (A8) and (A9) into Equation (5) and then performing the first-order derivative of the substituted 
equations relative to ?̃? ，we have 






















,               if 
3
4
< 𝑐𝑑 ≤ 1.
; 
(A10) 
In all, three groups of optimal solutions, depending on the range of 𝑐𝑑, have been solved (see Table A2). 
 
Table A2. Equilibrium Outcomes of Scenario RD 














































5 − (10 − 9𝑐𝑑)𝑐𝑑
20














Proof of Lemma 5 
We compare the sales of the national brand through the retailer in Scenario R with the sales in Scenario RD. From 
Table A2, we have:  


























































𝑅 and 𝜋𝑅𝐷 = (1 − 𝑐𝑑)


















= 𝜋𝑅. Thus, we have Lemma 5. 
Proof of Lemma 6 
In this scenario, we assume the store brand has been introduced by the retailer, and thus the fixed cost is a sunk cost 
that would not affect the retailer's choice. The sequence of the game is as follows: in Stage 1, the manufacturer sets the 
per-unit wholesale price, 𝑤, for the national brand. In Stage 2, the retailer determines the quantities of the national 
brand, 𝑞𝑟, and that of the store brand, 𝑞𝑠, while the manufacturer sets the quantity of the national brand through online 
channel, 𝑞𝑑. 
Using backward induction, in Stage 2, the manufacturer chooses its sales quantity of the national brand sold through 
the online channel. 
max 
𝑞𝑑
Π(𝑤, 𝑞𝑟 , 𝑞𝑠 , 𝑞𝑑) = 𝑤𝑞𝑟 + (𝑝𝑛 − 𝑐𝑑)𝑞𝑑 (A11) 




(1 − 2𝑐𝑑 + 𝑤). 
Simultaneously, the retailer determines its sale quantities for the national brand and store brand as follows: 
max
𝑞𝑟,𝑞𝑠
 𝜋(𝑤, 𝑞𝑟 , 𝑞𝑠, 𝑞𝑑) = (𝑝𝑛 − 𝑤)𝑞𝑟 + (𝑝𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠)𝑞𝑠 (A12) 
The Hessian matrix of 𝜋(𝑤, 𝑞𝑟 , 𝑞𝑠, 𝑞𝑑) is given by 𝐻 = (
−2 −2𝜃
−2𝜃 −2𝜃
). Because  𝐻11 = −2 < 0 and |𝐻| = 4𝜃(1 −
𝜃) > 0, the Hessian matrix of 𝜋(𝑤, 𝑞𝑟 , 𝑞𝑠, 𝑞𝑑)   is a negative definite for all values of 𝑞𝑟 and 𝑞𝑠. Jointly solving the 









In Stage 1, the manufacturer decides on the wholesale price 𝑤 as follows: 
max 
𝑤
Π(𝑤, 𝑞𝑟 , 𝑞𝑠 , 𝑞𝑑) = 𝑤𝑞𝑟 + (𝑝𝑛 − 𝑐𝑑)𝑞𝑑    𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑞𝑟 , 𝑞𝑠, 𝑞𝑑 ≥ 0 (A13) 










∨ (2𝑐𝑑 − 1)) < 𝑤 ≤
2(1−𝜃)+3𝑐𝑠+2(1−𝜃)𝑐𝑑
4−𝜃
, the equilibrium sale quantities in 






, and 𝑞𝑑(𝑤) =
1
3
(1 − 2𝑐𝑑 +
𝑤). 






 < 𝑐𝑑 ≤ 1 and 
𝑐𝑠
𝜃






, and 𝑞𝑑(𝑤) = 0. 
3. When 0 ≤ 𝑐𝑑 ≤
𝜃+𝑐𝑠
2𝜃
 and (2𝑐𝑑 − 1)






), the equilibrium sale quantities are 𝑞𝑟(𝑤) =
1
3
(1 + 𝑐𝑑 −
2𝑤), 𝑞𝑠(𝑤) = 0, and 𝑞𝑑(𝑤) =
1
3




< 𝑐𝑑 ≤ 1  and 0 ≤ 𝑤 ≤ ((2𝑐𝑑 − 1) ∧
𝑐𝑠
𝜃








)+ ≤ 𝑐𝑑 ≤
2−𝜃+𝑐𝑠
2
 and 𝑤 ≥
2(1−𝜃)+3𝑐𝑠+2(1−𝜃)𝑐𝑑
4−𝜃








6. When 0 ≤ 𝑐𝑑 ≤
2𝑐𝑠−𝜃
𝜃
 and 𝑤 >
1+𝑐𝑑
2











𝑞𝑑(𝑤) = 0. 
By solving the first-order condition, we obtain eight groups of optimal solutions, depending on the range of 𝑐𝑠  and 𝑐𝑑 
(see Table A3 and Table A4). 𝑓1(𝜃, 𝑐𝑠), 𝑓2(𝜃, 𝑐𝑠), ℎ1(𝜃, 𝑐𝑑), and ℎ1(𝜃, 𝑐𝑑) are generated from Table A4.
 
Table A3. Equilibrium Outcomes of Scenario RSD 
Outcome I II III IV 
𝑤𝑅𝑆𝐷  
10(1 − 𝜃) + 9𝑐𝑠 − 2(1 − 𝜃)𝑐𝑑
2(10 − 𝜃)
 2𝑐𝑑 − 1 








2𝜃(1 − 𝜃) + (8 + 𝜃)𝑐𝑠 + 2(1 − 𝜃)(8 − 𝜃)𝑐𝑑
4(10 − 𝜃)(1 − 𝜃)
 
2 − 𝜃 + 𝑐𝑠 − 2𝑐𝑑
2(1 − 𝜃)
 
1 − 𝜃 + 𝑐𝑠
4(1 − 𝜃)
 





10𝜃(1 − 𝜃) − (20 − 11𝜃)𝑐𝑠 − 2𝜃(1 − 𝜃)𝑐𝑑
4(10 − 𝜃)(1 − 𝜃)
 
−𝜃 − 𝑐𝑠 + 2𝜃𝑐𝑑
2𝜃(1 − 𝜃)
 





2(5 − 2𝜃) + 3𝑐𝑠 − 2(7 − 𝜃)𝑐𝑑
2(10 − 𝜃)
 0 0 





10 − 4𝜃 + 3𝑐𝑠 + 6𝑐𝑑
2(10 − 𝜃)
 𝑐𝑑 
3 − 𝜃 + 𝑐𝑠
4
 














𝜃 + 𝑐𝑠 + 𝜃𝑐𝑑
3
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Table A4. Equilibrium Divisions of Scenario RSD 
























10 − 4𝜃 + 3𝑐𝑠
14 − 2𝜃
,



































































































































































Proof of Proposition 1 
In what follows, we assume 𝜃 ∈ (
10
37
, 1) to avoid trivial cases such as shown in Figure A1 where 𝜃 = 0.2. Compare 
with Figure 5a where 𝜃 = 0.5, we may find the results are the same but the relative positions of the boundaries are 
different, which will influence the comparison process we conduct later. Thus, since those trivial cases will not provide 
new insights to our main results but simply make mathematical analysis more complicated, we choose to concentrate 
on more reasonable regions of 𝜃. 




Figure A1. Equilibrium Comparison Between Scenario RD and Scenario RSD (𝜽 = 𝟎. 𝟐). 
By solving the equation set  𝑐𝑠 =
𝜃(1−𝜃)
2−𝜃
 and 𝑐𝑑 =
10𝜃(1−𝜃)−(20−11𝜃)𝑐𝑠
2𝜃(1−𝜃)
，we have the coordinates of point T in Figure 







By taking the values of each variables in Table A3 into Equation (A11) and Equation (A12) respectively, we obtain 
the manufacturer's and retailer's equilibrium profits of subgame 𝑒 = 1 in Scenario RSD as follows: 
In region I, Π𝑅𝑆𝐷 =
1
8

















In region II, Π𝑅𝑆𝐷 =
(1−2𝑐𝑑)(𝜃−2−𝑐𝑠+2𝑐𝑑)
2(1−𝜃)























In region V, Π𝑅𝑆𝐷 =
(𝜃−𝑐𝑠)𝑐𝑠
2𝜃2





In region VI, Π𝑅𝑆𝐷 =
5−(10−9𝑐𝑑)𝑐𝑑
20





In region VII, Π𝑅𝑆𝐷 = (3 − 2𝑐𝑑)𝑐𝑑 − 1 and 𝜋
𝑅𝑆𝐷 = (1 − 𝑐𝑑)
2; 
In region VIII, Π𝑅𝑆𝐷 =
1
8




As shown in Lemma 6, when the operational cost of the store brand is relatively high (𝑔2(𝜃, 𝑐𝑑) < 𝑐𝑠 < 1), the retailer 
would not introduce the store brand, and thus the store brand has no effect on the manufacturer's channel strategy. In 
this case, we concentrate only on the remaining regions. We label the equilibrium regions in Scenario RD and RSD 
(see Table A2 and Table A4) as 𝑖𝑅𝐷(𝑖 = I, II, III)and 𝑗𝑅𝑆𝐷(𝑗 =  I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII), respectively, and we use 
𝑖𝑅𝐷 ∩ 𝑗𝑅𝑆𝐷 to represent the common region shared by 𝑖𝑅𝐷 and 𝑗𝑅𝑆𝐷 . We conduct the following analysis. 
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> 0, thus Π𝑅𝑆𝐷 − Π𝑅𝐷is a convex function of 𝑐𝑑 and 







. Considering the boundary condition, Π𝑅𝑆𝐷 −
Π𝑅𝐷 achieves its maximum value in 𝑐𝑑






















< 0. Then (Π𝑅𝑆𝐷 − Π𝑅𝐷)𝑚𝑎𝑥  achieves its maximum value −
45𝜃2
4(20−11𝜃)2



































. We assume 𝑥(𝑐𝑑) =
𝜋𝑚𝑖𝑛






< 0.  Thus 𝑥(𝑐𝑑)  is a concave function of 𝑐𝑑  and achieves its 




. Further,  𝑥(𝑐𝑑) achieves its minimum value 
9𝜃2
(20−11𝜃)2
> 0 when 𝑐𝑑 =
0. Thus we obtain Π𝑅𝑆𝐷 > Π𝑅𝐷. 






< 0,  thus Π𝑅𝑆𝐷 − Π𝑅𝐷  achieves the maximum value 



















< 0. Considering the boundary condition, 
(Π𝑅𝑆𝐷 − Π𝑅𝐷)𝑚𝑎𝑥  achieves the maximum value −
9𝜃2(11−2𝜃)
2(7−4𝜃)2(49−9𝜃)












> 0, thus 𝜋𝑅𝑆𝐷 is a convex function of 𝑐𝑠 and achieves its minimum value in 𝑐𝑠
∗ =
𝜃(2𝑐𝑑 − 1) <
3−𝜃+𝑐𝑠
4
.  Considering the boundary condition, 𝜋𝑚𝑖𝑛





= 𝜋𝑅𝐷 . Thus we obtain 
𝜋𝑅𝑆𝐷 > 𝜋𝑅𝐷 . 






























≤ 𝜃 < 1  and 0 < 𝑐𝑠 <
𝜃(1−𝜃)
2−𝜃















> 0  then  (Π𝑅𝑆𝐷 − Π𝑅𝐷)𝑚𝑎𝑥  achieves the minimum value in 
𝑐𝑠































































































= 𝜋𝑅𝐷 . Thus we obtain 𝜋𝑅𝑆𝐷 > 𝜋𝑅𝐷 . 
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Thus we obtain 𝜋𝑅𝑆𝐷 ≥ 𝜋𝑅𝐷 . 














































































𝑅𝐷  in 𝑐𝑠
∗ = 𝜃 >
3𝜃
7
. Thus we obtain 𝜋𝑅𝑆𝐷 ≥ 𝜋𝑅𝐷 . 
6. Regions II𝑅𝐷 ∩ III𝑅𝑆𝐷:  we obtain 
∂2(Π𝑅𝑆𝐷−Π𝑅𝐷)
∂𝑐𝑑
2 = 4 > 0, thus Π











 when  𝑐𝑑 =
5
7







> 0, then we obtain (Π𝑅𝑆𝐷 − Π𝑅𝐷)𝑚𝑎𝑥  achieve the minimum value in 𝑐𝑠
∗ = 𝜃 − 1 < 0. 
Further, (Π𝑅𝑆𝐷 − Π𝑅𝐷)𝑚𝑎𝑥  achieve the maximum value 
1−𝜃−12𝜃2
98(2−𝜃)2
< 0 when 𝜃 ∈ (
1
3




















𝑅𝐷 . Thus we obtain 𝜋𝑅𝑆𝐷 ≥ 𝜋𝑅𝐷 . 
7. Regions  II𝑅𝐷 ∩ V𝑅𝑆𝐷: we obtain 
∂2(Π𝑅𝑆𝐷−Π𝑅𝐷)
∂𝑐𝑑
2 = 4 > 0, then Π




. Considering the boundary condition,  (Π𝑅𝑆𝐷 − Π𝑅𝐷)𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 0 when 𝑐𝑑 =
𝜃+𝑐𝑠
2𝜃






, we obtain 𝜋𝑅𝑆𝐷 ≥ 𝜋𝑅𝐷 . 






> 0, thus Π𝑅𝑆𝐷 achieves the minimum value in 𝑐𝑑





 when 𝑐𝑑 =
𝜃(1−𝜃)
2−𝜃
. Since 𝜃 ∈ (
1
3
, 1) , Π𝑚𝑎𝑥







= Π𝑅𝐷 in 𝜃 =
1
3






















. Thus we obtain 
𝜋𝑅𝑆𝐷 > 𝜋𝑅𝐷 . 




















= 𝜋𝑅𝐷 , we obtain 𝜋𝑅𝑆𝐷 > 𝜋𝑅𝐷 .  
In all, we conclude that 𝜋𝑅𝑆𝐷 ≥ 𝜋𝑅𝐷 and Π𝑅𝑆𝐷 < Π𝑅𝐷 . 
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Proof of Lemma 7 
Taking into account the fixed development cost 𝑔, the retailer’s equilibrium store brand development decision is 
obtained by comparing the profit in Scenario RD and Scenario RSD. Thus, if and only if Π𝑅
𝑅𝑆𝐷 − Π𝑅
𝑅𝐷 > 𝑔,  the retailer 
develops the store brand. When 𝑔2(𝜃, 𝑐𝑑) < 𝑐𝑠 ≤ 1 , the store brand has no effect on retailer’s profit. Thus, the retailer 
does not develop it regardless of 𝑔. When  𝑔1(𝜃, 𝑐𝑑) < 𝑐𝑠 ≤ 𝑔2(𝜃, 𝑐𝑑), let 𝑔 = Π𝑅
𝑅𝑆𝐷 − Π𝑅
𝑅𝐷 at 𝑤∗ =
𝑐𝑠
𝜃
. If 𝑔 < 𝑔, the 
increase in profit with store brand more than offsets the fixed cost 𝑔. Thus the retailer develops the store brand. 
Otherwise, the retailer does not. Similarly, we can derive the rest of the results by combining the results from our 
earlier sections. 
Proof of Proposition 2 
Please refer to Figure 4, where the coordinates of point T in Figure 4a is solved in the Proof of Proposition 1. 
Proof of Proposition 3 
As shown in Lemma 6, when the operational cost in the online channel is relatively high (𝑓2(𝜃, 𝑐𝑠) ≤ 𝑐𝑑 ≤ 1), the 
manufacturer does not introduce the online channel, and thus the online channel has no effect on the retailer. In what 
follows, we concentrate only on the remaining regions. Similarly, we label the equilibrium regions in Scenario RS and 
RSD (see Table A1 and Table A4) as 𝑘𝑅𝑆(𝑘 = I, II, III) and 𝑗𝑅𝑆𝐷(𝑗 =  I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII), respectively, and we 
use 𝑘𝑅𝑆 ∩ 𝑗𝑅𝑆𝐷 to represent the common region shared by 𝑘𝑅𝑆 and 𝑗𝑅𝑆𝐷. 





. We first ignore the constraints of 𝜃, 𝑐𝑠 , 
and 𝑐𝑑 , and have  Π
𝑅𝑆𝐷 − Π𝑅𝑆 > 0 if 0 ≤ 𝑐𝑑 ≤ 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 ≤ 𝑐𝑑 ≤ 1, where 𝑥1 =
1
18−2𝜃
{10 − 2𝜃 + 𝑐𝑠 − [10 −
21𝜃 + 12𝜃2 − 𝜃3 + (20 − 22𝜃 + 2𝜃2)𝑐𝑠 + (10 − 𝜃)𝑐𝑠
2]
1
2}  and 𝑥2 =
1
18−2𝜃
{10 − 2𝜃 + 𝑐𝑠 + [10 − 21𝜃 +
12𝜃2 − 𝜃3 + (20 − 22𝜃 + 2𝜃2)𝑐𝑠 + (10 − 𝜃)𝑐𝑠
2]
1
2}. Here, we can easily prove 𝑥1 and  𝑥2 both are larger than 
0. Then we compare the constraints of 𝜃, 𝑐𝑠, and 𝑐𝑑 with the above results to obtain the constrained solutions. We 















− 2] , which is a linear function of 𝑐𝑠  with  the 
maximum value of  
(1−𝜃)[2𝜃−20−(7−𝜃)√10−𝜃]
2(9−𝜃)(7−𝜃)
< 0  at 𝑐𝑠 = 0 . Thus  𝑥1 −
10−4𝜃+3𝑐𝑠
14−2𝜃






















0  if 𝑐𝑠 ≤ 𝐴1 , where 𝐴1 =
1
360−396𝜃+107𝜃2+𝜃3
[160𝜃 − 247𝜃2 + 86𝜃3 + 𝜃4 + 2𝜃(10 − 41𝜃 + 64𝜃2 − 46𝜃3 +
14𝜃4 − 𝜃5)
1
2]. Thus we  obtain the boundary condition that Π𝑅𝑆𝐷 − Π𝑅𝐷 > 0 if either 0 ≤ 𝑐𝑠 ≤ 𝐴1 and 0 ≤ 𝑐𝑑 ≤
1
18−2𝜃
{10 − 2𝜃 + 𝑐𝑠 − [10 − 21𝜃 + 12𝜃
2 − 𝜃3 + (20 − 22𝜃 + 2𝜃2)𝑐𝑠 + (10 − 𝜃)𝑐𝑠
2]
1




and 0 ≤ 𝑐𝑑 ≤
10𝜃(1−𝜃)−(20−11𝜃)𝑐𝑠
2𝜃(1−𝜃)















− 2], which is a 














> 0  at 𝑐𝑠 =
3𝜃(1−𝜃)
7−4𝜃
. Thus  𝑥2 −
10−4𝜃+3𝑐𝑠
14−2𝜃


















− 8]  , which is a linear function of 𝑐𝑠  with  the minimum value of  
(1−𝜃)[2𝜃−20+(7−𝜃)√10−𝜃]
2(9−𝜃)(7−4𝜃)
> 0 at 𝑐𝑠 =
3𝜃(1−𝜃)
7−4𝜃
. Thus  𝑥2 −
10𝜃(1−𝜃)−(20−11𝜃)𝑐𝑠
2𝜃(1−𝜃)
> 0. So we conclude 𝑥2 ≤ 𝑐𝑑 ≤ 1 is 
out of the range of 𝑐𝑑 . 









. We first 
ignore the constraints of 𝜃, 𝑐𝑠,  and 𝑐𝑑 , and have  𝜋
𝑅𝑆𝐷 − 𝜋𝑅𝑆 > 0  if 𝑥3 ≤ 𝑐𝑑 ≤ 1 , where 𝑥3 =
1
128−62𝜃+6𝜃2
{14𝜃2 − 86𝜃 + (76 − 13𝜃)𝑐𝑠 + [6400 + 8420𝜃 − 4476𝜃
2 + 1517𝜃3 − 206𝜃4 + 9𝜃5 −




2} (Since 14𝜃2 − 86𝜃 +
(76 − 13𝜃)𝑐𝑠  achieves its maximum value 
−𝜃(10−𝜃)
128−62𝜃+6𝜃2
< 0  at 𝑐𝑠 = 𝜃 , we have 
1
128−62𝜃+6𝜃2
{14𝜃2 − 86𝜃 +
(76 − 13𝜃)𝑐𝑠 − [6400 + 8420𝜃 − 4476𝜃
2 + 1517𝜃3 − 206𝜃4 + 9𝜃5 − (12800 − 5160𝜃 + 2448𝜃2 −




2} < 0 , which is unfeasible). Then we compare the 
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[4 + 97𝜃 − 26𝜃2 + 9𝜃3 + (4 + 9𝜃)𝑐𝑠
2 − (18𝜃2 − 26𝜃 +
128)𝑐𝑠]
1
2 < 0, then we have y(𝑐𝑠) = −(5 − 𝜃)(64 − 31𝜃 + 3𝜃
2)𝑐𝑠
2 − 2(1 − 𝜃)(5 − 𝜃)(64 − 31𝜃 + 3𝜃2)𝑐𝑠 +
1139𝜃 − 824𝜃2 + 314𝜃3 − 52𝜃4 + 3𝜃5 − 1300 < 0. y(𝑐𝑠) achieves its maximum value at 𝑐𝑠 = 𝜃 − 1 ≤ 0, 
thus we have y(0) = 1139𝜃 − 824𝜃2 + 314𝜃3 − 52𝜃4 + 3𝜃5 − 1300 is the maximum value of y(𝑐𝑠) in the 
feasible range of 𝑐𝑠. Since y(0) < 0 when 0 < θ < 1, we have proved 𝑥3 −
10−4𝜃+3𝑐𝑠
14−2𝜃
< 0. Thus we have 𝑥3 <
10−4𝜃+3𝑐𝑠
14−2𝜃
. Similarly, we have 𝑐𝑠 ≤ 𝐴2  when 𝑥3 −
10𝜃(1−𝜃)−(20−11𝜃)𝑐𝑠
2𝜃(1−𝜃)
< 0 , where 𝐴2 =
1
256−324𝜃+107𝜃2−3𝜃3
[128𝜃 − 211𝜃2 + 86𝜃3 − 3𝜃4 − 2𝜃(64 − 145𝜃 + 84𝜃2 + 14𝜃3 − 20𝜃4 + 3𝜃5)
1
2]. So we 
conclude that 𝜋𝑅𝑆𝐷 − 𝜋𝑅𝑆 > 0  if either  0 ≤ 𝑐𝑠 ≤
3𝜃(1−𝜃)
7−4𝜃






< 𝑐𝑠 ≤ 𝐴2 and 








= Π𝑅𝑆, then we obtain Π𝑅𝑆𝐷 ≤ Π𝑅𝑆. 
Since 𝜋𝑅𝑆𝐷 − 𝜋𝑅𝑆 =
(3−𝜃+𝑐𝑠−4𝑐𝑑)(5−3𝜃+3𝑐𝑠−4𝑐𝑑)
16(1−𝜃)






,  then  𝜋𝑅𝑆𝐷 − 𝜋𝑅𝑆 ≥ 0 . Thus we 
obtain 𝜋𝑅𝑆𝐷 ≥ 𝜋𝑅𝑆. 
3. Regions  I𝑅𝑆 ∩ IV𝑅𝑆𝐷 : by comparing Π𝑅𝑆𝐷  with Π𝑅𝑆  , we obtain the boundary condition that Π𝑅𝑆𝐷 − Π𝑅𝑆 > 0 
if 𝐴1 < 𝑐𝑠 ≤
𝜃(1−𝜃)
2−𝜃







































4. Regions  II𝑅𝑆 ∩ I𝑅𝑆𝐷: we obtain 
∂2Π𝑅𝑆𝐷
∂𝑐𝑑
2 = 1 −
1
10−𝜃
> 0, then  Π𝑅𝑆𝐷 is a convex function of 𝑐𝑑 and achieves its 













𝑅𝑆𝐷 − Π𝑅𝑆 =
[3𝜃(1−𝜃)−(7−4𝜃)𝑐𝑠][6𝜃(1−𝜃)−(13−7𝜃)𝑐𝑠]
2𝜃2(1−𝜃)2
> 0 , then we 

































> 0,  then 𝜋𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑅𝑆𝐷  is a convex function of 𝑐𝑠 and achieves its 


















𝑅𝑆𝐷 . Thus we obtain 𝜋𝑅𝑆 > 𝜋𝑅𝑆𝐷 . 


























































> 0, Then we obtain 𝜋𝑅𝑆 > 𝜋𝑅𝑆𝐷. 
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By comparing 𝜋𝑅𝑆𝐷  with 𝜋𝑅𝑆 , we obtain the boundary condition that 𝜋𝑅𝑆𝐷 − 𝜋𝑅𝑆 > 0  if 
3𝜃
7










7. Regions II𝑅𝑆 ∩ VII𝑅𝑆𝐷:   we obtain 
∂2Π𝑅𝑆𝐷
∂𝑐𝑑
2 = −4 < 0,  then Π
𝑅𝑆𝐷  is a concave function of  𝑐𝑑  and achieves its 




















= Π𝑅𝑆.  Thus we obtain 






= 𝜋𝑅𝑆, then we obtain 𝜋𝑅𝑆𝐷 ≥ 𝜋𝑅𝑆. 
8. Regions  III𝑅𝑆 ∩ VI𝑅𝑆𝐷: by comparing Π𝑅𝑆𝐷 with Π𝑅𝑆, we have the boundary condition that  Π𝑅𝑆𝐷 − Π𝑅𝑆 > 0  if  
𝜃
2




By comparing 𝜋𝑅𝑆𝐷  with 𝜋𝑅𝑆 , we obtain the boundary condition that 𝜋𝑅𝑆𝐷 − 𝜋𝑅𝑆 > 0 if 
𝜃
2








9. Regions III𝑅𝑆 ∩ VII𝑅𝑆𝐷 : we obtain 
∂2Π𝑅𝑆𝐷
∂𝑐𝑑
2 = −4 < 0, then 𝜋
𝑅𝑆𝐷  is a concave function of 𝑐𝑑  and achieves its 













= 𝜋𝑅𝑆 , then we obtain 𝜋𝑅𝑆𝐷 ≥ 𝜋𝑅𝑆 . 
In all, we conclude that Π𝑅𝑆𝐷 < Π𝑅𝑆 if 𝑓3(𝜃, 𝑐𝑠) < 𝑐𝑑 ≤ 𝑓2(𝜃, 𝑐𝑠), and 𝜋
𝑅𝑆𝐷 > 𝜋𝑅𝑆 if 𝑓4(𝜃, 𝑐𝑠) <  𝑐𝑑 ≤ 𝑓2(𝜃, 𝑐𝑠). 
Proof of Proposition 4 
We conduct a similar analysis to compare the sales of the national brand in Scenario RS and Scenario RSD, and the 
results are shown in Table A5. 
Table A5. Comparison of 𝒒𝒏
𝑹𝑺 and 𝒒𝒏
𝑹𝑺𝑫 





























































10 − 3𝜃 + 2𝑐𝑠
16 − 2𝜃
,


























Proof of Proposition 5 
Please refer to Figure 5. 
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